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i
NOTE ON INDEXING TO REPORTER TRANSCRIPTS
Citations in this brief to the record in
the court below are as follows:
R.

Record on Appeal

Tr.

Transcript of Testimony of hearing held on
January 27, 1976, before the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist

Tp.

i

4

Transcript of Proceedings of hearing held on
October 1, 1975, before the Honorable Calvin
Gould

4

I

I

I

1

-ii-
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,
~vs-

:
Case No,
14485

:

FARHAD SOROUSHIRN,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged in the Second Judicial District
Court of Weber County upon an information alleging a violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iii) (1953), as amended, in
that he "distributed a controlled substance for value, to-wit:
Marijuana,"
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried in the Second Judicial District
Court, in and for Weber County, before the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist, sitting without a jury.

Appellant was found not

guilty of distributing a controlled substance for value as
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charged, but was found guilty of a lesser included offense,
distributing a controlled substance not for value.
was sentenced upon the above stated conviction.

Appellant

It is from

that verdict and judgment that appellant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of appellant's
conviction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 29, 1974, Officer L. J. Call, an
Ogden Police Department undercover agent, purchased marijuana
from one Farhad Soroushirn, identified as the defendant by
Officer Call (Tr.35,37).

Officer Call was accompanied by and

led to defendant's apartment by a black college student,
Terrell Eady (Tr.41).

On this occasion, Officer Call, Terrell

Eady and the defendant went to an Ogden residence where
marijuana was obtained through the defendant Soroushirnfs
contact (Tr.42).

On this occasion, Terrell Eady rather than

Officer Call requested that the defendant make the purchase
of marijuana (Tr.42).
On two other occasions between October 30 and
November 4, 1974, Officer Call again contacted defendant,
this time without Terrell Eady, and asked him whether he or
his contact had additional marijuana for sale.
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His reply

on both occasions was simply, "no, my contact does not have
any."

Defendant made no expression of an unwillingness to

sell (Tr.5).
Officer Call returned to defendant's apartment,
again alone, on November 5, 19 74.

This time in response to

a like inquiry, defendant, without being entreated to do so,
joined Officer Call in his car and led him to an Ogden
residence.

At this residence, defendant did sell Officer

Call marijuana (Tr.37,38).
On the following day, November 6, 1974, a complaint
alleging distribution of marijuana for value and referring to
the October 29, 1974, incident was signed by the Weber County
Attorney and filed with the City Clerk.

Shortly thereafter,

County Attorney Prosecutor Robert Wallace, and attorney for
defense William Marsh, entered into plea negotiations regarding
the purchases occurring on October 29, 1974, and November 5,
1974 (Tr.79).

Pursuant to those negotiations, defendant plead

guilty to a reduced charge of possession of marijuana, a Class
"B" Misdemeanor (Tr.79).

However, on February 19, 1975, the

date set for sentencing, defendant made an oral request to withdraw his plea of guilty (Tp.20).

On April 2, 1975, defendant

was allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty, entered pursuant
to the above mentioned negotiations (Tp.20).

-3-
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Following defendant's withdrawal of his guilty
plea, he made motion to dismiss the State's action on grounds
of entrapment.

One day later, on May 22, 1975, after

reevaluation of the two purchases, the State decided to
dismiss the complaint alleging distribution for value on

,

October 29, 1974, and filed a new complaint alleging the facts
arising out of the November 5, 1974, purchase (Tp.20).
prosecutor

The

responsible for the dismissal of the October

*

29th charge and filing of the November 5th complaint testified
at defendant's trial that this was done because the county
attorney's office believed the second purchase on November 5,
1974, was a stronger case for the State (Tr.87).

i

^

On May 29, 1975, the date set for trial, the first
complaint was dismissed and the second complaint was filed.

\

Summons on the second complaint was not served on defendant at
that time because of representations made by the defense that
defendant would be out of the country for the summer (Tp.21).

<

The State became aware of defendant's presence in
this country on July 3, 1975, when defendant was picked up and
arrested on charges of possession of a controlled substance
(Tp.21).

^

At the time of defendant's arraignment on the charge

of possession the Weber County Attorney's Office had him
arraigned on the complaint charging distribution for value,
occurring on November 5, 1974.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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'

At arraignment in district court on the second
prosecution, appellant moved to dismiss, raising the defenses
of (1) entrapment, (2) double jeopardy, and (3) denial of
speedy trial (R.9-10).

Defendant's motion to dismiss

the information was denied (R.30).
Defendant's case was then set for a jury trial on
January 27, 1976.

Defendant then waived his right to a jury

trial (Minute Entry, R.36).
On the day of the trial defendant appeared and
moved the court for an order compelling the State to produce
Terrell Eady as a witness for defendant.

The court denied

the motion and ordered the case to trial*
After hearing the evidence, the trial court judge
found defendant guilty of distribution not for value.

The

trial judge stated that he was not satisfied that defendant
was guilty of distributing a controlled substance for value
but was satisfied that defendant stood ready and willing to
distribute not for value.

The trial judge therefore

found appellant guilty of the lesser included offense (Tr.102).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
APPELLANT GUILTY OF DISTRIBUTION NOT FOR
VALUE.
Appellant was charged with distributing a controlled
substanceDigitized
forby value.
In Law
a Library,
non-jury
trial,
Wahlquist
the Howard W. Hunter
J. Reuben Clark
Law School,Judge
BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

after hearing evidence from both defense and prosecution,
found appellant guilty of distributing a controlled
substance, not for value.

Distributing not for values is

a lesser included offense of the crime of distributing for
value.

In so finding, Judge Wahlguist stated the following:
"Insofar as the facts of the
crime are concerned, the court believes
that what has occurred is this: The
court believes that the defendant stood
ready, willing, and able to share with
others possession and use and division
of marijuana.
The court is not convinced that
he was necessarily in a position or
made a habit of selling marijuana."
(Tr.102).

<

1

Stated simply, the trial judge in this case did
not find the State's evidence sufficient to sustain a verdict
of guity as to the major offense, distributing for value.

<

The trial judge did, however, find the evidence sufficient to
support a verdict of guilty as to the lesser included offense.
Appellant contends that the trial judge found

^

appellant not guilty of the major offense because of entrapment and guilty of the lesser offense because it found entrapment to be only a "partial defense."

'

Appellant bases this argument on the following
observation made by Judge Wahlquist:
"The court believes that entrapment may operate through instrumentalities
or other persons that the conduct of Eddie
is such that under the objective standard,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
it might
take one who is willing to distribute
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
mariiuana not for sale and cause them to

*

be involved in a valued distribution.
In other words, I believe in this
case entrapment is a partial defense.
It may have a tendency of increasing the
nature of the crime, for this reason
the court finds him guilty, not guilty
of entrapment insofar as the major offense
is concerned because of entrapment, but
finds that the conduct of entrapment, but
finds that the conduct of entrapment in
no way entrapped him into sharing possession
and making division of marijuana. For
that reason I find him guilty of the lesser
offense of distributing not for value."
(Tr.102,103).
Respondent's understanding of Judge Wahlquist's
statement concerning entrapment is this.

Judge Wahlquist

found appellant guilty of distributing marijuana not for
value but found that appellant would not have distributed for
value had it not been for Officer Call's providing the money
and making the request.

The trial court therefore felt that

appellant was entrapped into distributing for value but not
entrapped into distributing not for value.
Appellant argues, however, that any finding of
entrapment compels the trial court to dismiss the case with
prejudice.

This position is not supported by statute.

In the chapter on entrapment, Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-303 (1977), subsections (4) and (5) read as
follows:

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"(4) Upon written motion of
the defendant, the court shall hear
evidence on the issue and shall
determine as a matter of fact and
law whether the defendant was entrapped
to commit the offense. Defendant's
motion shall be made at least ten days
before trial except the court for good
cause shown may permit a later filing.
(5) Should the court determine
that the defendant was entrapped, it
shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but
if the court determines the defendant was
not entrapped, such issue may be presented
by the defendant to the jury at trial.
Any order by the court dismissing a case
based on entrapment shall be appealable
by the state."
Subsections (4) and (5) provide that the trial
court, upon defendant's motion, shall hear evidence on the
issue of entrapment.

Should the trial court at that time

determine that defendant was entrapped, the case should be
dismissed with prejudice.

Should the court find that

defendant was not entrapped the case should go to trial,
at which time evidence of entrapment may still be admitted
for consideration by the trier of fact.

Should the trier

of fact find entrapment at trial, the statute does not
require a dismissal of the case.
In the present case, defendant, prior to tirial,
was granted an evidentiary hearing to consider his motion
to dismiss.

Defendant's motion properly raised the defense

of entrapment.

Judge Gould, presiding over the evidentiary

hearing, found as a matter of law and fact that defendant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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had not been entrapped into distributing for value.

Had

Judge Gould found entrapment at that time, the case would
have been dismissed with prejudice.
Defendant's case was then tried in a non-jury
trial before Judge Wahlquist.

Judge Wahlquist, the trier

of fact, listened to evidence concerning the defense of
entrapment, as provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(5)
(1977).

After hearing all the evidence Judge Wahlquist

found appellant not guilty of distribution for value,
because of entrapment, and guilty of distribution not
for value, finding no entrapment to have been involved.
Judge Wahlquistfs determination that appellant
^ would not have distributed for value had he not been
entrapped did not, according to the statute, mandate that
the case be dismissed.
Judge Wahlquist was authorized in finding appellant
guilty of the lesser included offense of distributing not
for value, provided there was no entrapment involved in
appellantfs non-valued distribution.
This was Judge Wahlquist1s conclusion as is
evidenced by the statement:
". . . [The court] finds that the
conduct of entrapment in no way entrapped
him into sharing possession and making
division of marijuana. For that reason
I find him guilty of the lesser offense
distributing
forLawvalue."
(Tr.l03)#
Digitized by theof
Howard
W. Hunter Law Library, J. not
Reuben Clark
School, BYU.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S
PLEA OF FORMER JEOPARDY.
Appellant entered a plea of "once in jeopardy"
at his arraignment, on the charge of distribution for
value occurring on November 5, 1974, and moved for the
court to dismiss the action (R.9-10,23-29).

The motion

was denied.
Appellant distributed a controlled substance
to Officer Call on two separate occasions*

The first

distribution occurred on October 29r 1974, in the presence
i

of Terrell Eady.

The second distribution occurred on

November 5, 1974, a full week later, Officer Call being alone.
The Weber County Prosecutor after initially charging
1

appellant with the October 29th offense, dismissed that case
and filed the November 5th case against appellant,

the

second case being the stronger of the two.
i

The October 29th case was dismissed before appellant
was brought to trial, before a jury had been empaneled, and
before a decision had been reached concerning appellant's
i

motion to dismiss the October 29th charge because of
entrapment.
Appellant contends that the dismissal by the
prosecution of the October 29th distribution for value case
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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and subsequent prosecution of the November 5th distribution
for value case constituted double jeopardy.
Collateral estoppel or double jeopardy as it is
referred to in criminal cases, State v. Pruitt, 531 P.2d
860, 862 (Kan, 1975), is a federal and state constitutional
protection against putting a person in jeopardy twice for the
same offense.
1973).

People v. Smith, 512 P.2d 269f 272 (Colo.

Appellant's claim of double jeopardy applies not to

one single offense but to two separate and distinct
offenses, and therefore the protection against double
jeopardy does not apply.
That appellant's distribution of a controlled
substance on two different occasions constituted two
separate offenses is supported by the decision of this
Court in State v. Dolan, 502 P.2d 549 (Utah 1972).

In

that case, defendant plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge
of writing a bad check on August 16f 1971.

Defendant was

also later convicted of two felony charges for writing bad
checks on July 22, 1971, and August 3, 14 and 15, 1971. All
of these bad check writings were known to the prosecution
at the time defendant plead guilty to the misdemeanor charge
of writing a bad check.

Defendant appealed from the felony

conviction, claiming double jeopardy.

The Utah Supreme

Court concluded that there was no double jeopardy in that
case.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In Disherson v. State, 518 P.2d 892 (1974 Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals), the defendant claimed that his
alleged act of distributing marijuana to undercover
agents on four different occasions constituted one offense
and therefore the act of trying him on more than one
charge constituted double jeopardy.

In finding no double

jeopardy, the Oklahoma Court stated:
"After carefully reviewing the
record in the three cases in which
he was convicted, we are of the
opinion that each sale was a separate
and distinct offense and find this
proposition to be without merit."
Id. at 895.
Respondent argues that appellantfs distribution of
marijuana on October 29, 1974, and November 5, 1974, constituted two separate offenses and therefore the protection of
not being placed in jeopardy twice for a single offense
does not apply.
Even if this Court concluded that appellant's two
separate distributions of a controlled substance constituted
a single offense, double jeopardy would not attach until
a jury is empaneled" or if it is a non-jury trial, the actual
trial of the case has begun.

This was the ruling of this

Court in the case of Boyer v. Larson, 433 P.2d 1015, 1016
(1967).

In the case of Serf ass v. United States,. 95 S.Ct. 1055

(1975), which stands for the same principle as enunciated in
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Boyer v. Digitized
Larson,
supra,
the United States Supreme Court stated:
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"As an aid to the decision of
cases in which the prohibition of
the Double Jeopardy Clause has been
invoked, the courts have found it
useful to define a point in criminal
proceedings at which the constitutional
purposes and policies are implicated
by resort to the concept of 'attachment
of jeopardy.1 . . . In the case of a
jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a
jury is empaneled and sworn, . • In a
nonjury trial, jeopardy attaches when
the court begins to hear evidence. . .
The Court has consistently adhered to
the view that jeopardy does not attachf
and the constitutional prohibition can
have no applicationf until a defendant
is 'put to trial before the trier of facts9
whether the trier be a jury or a judge.1"
Id. at 1062.
In the present case, the record shows that the
case was dismissed by the prosecution prior to either an
empaneling of a jury or an actual trial before a trial
court judge.

Double jeopardy therefore could not have

attached in the present case.
Appellant relies on Ashe v. Swenson, 90 S.Ct. 1189
(1970), to support his contentions that double jeopardy
occurred in this case. Ashe v. Swensonf supra, states that
collateral estoppel is applied when an issue of ultimate
fact has been determined by a valid and final judgment.
Appellant does not contend that a valid and final judgment
was reached in the first case brought against appellant.
It is clear from the record that no judgment whatsoever was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may
.1contain
0__ errors.

made.

Respondent urges this Court to affirm the trial

court's denial of appellant's double jeopardy claim on the
basis that the two distributions constituted separate
offenses and that double jeopardy had not attached at the
time the first case brought against appellant was dismissed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO ORDER THE STATE TO
PRODUCE TERRELL EADY AS A WITNESS.
Appellant claims that the trial court in refusing
his motion for compulsory process denied him a fair trial.
The witness appellant sought to have testify at
his trial was one Terrell Eady.

(

As has been stated, Mr.

Eadyf formerly a black student at Weber State College,
assisted Officer Call in contacting appellant and was

j

present on October 29, 1974, when appellant distributed
marijuana to Officer Call (Tr.42).

Mr. Eady was not present,

however, on November 5, 1974, when the crime for which

<

appellant has been convicted occurred (Tr.37,38).
Prior to trial on the October 29, 1974, distribution
charge a hearing on the issue of entrapment was held.

Mr.

{

Eady testified as a witness for appellant in that hearing
(Tp.24).

Following the hearing, Weber County Prosecutor

Robert Wallace chose to dismiss the October 29th charge against
appellant.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. Wallace took the stand at appellant's
trial and in response to counsel for appellant's question,
concerning his reasons for dismissing the first case and
prosecuting the second, stated:
"So tactically I felt the second
case to be stronger and plus the fact
that you have the evidence of the
first case to show some previous
position or some earlier contact with
the defendant, and so I decided that
it would be better tactically to
proceed on one trial." (Tr.87).
The State dismissed the October 29th charge
of distribution and prosecuted the November 5th distribution
for the simple tactical reason that their November 5th case
was stronger.
On the day of appellant's trial on the November 5th
charge, appellant's counsel moved the court for an order
compelling the State to produce Mr. Eady as a witness (Tr.3).
After hearing argument on both sides concerning the relevance
of Mr. Eady's testimony, the court denied appellant's motion
for compulsory process but reserved the right to continue the
trial or dismiss the case if it appeared appellant was
prejudiced by this ruling (Tr.ll).

Neither a continuance

nor a dismissal was issued by the trial court and the denial
of appellant's motion was left standing.
At the trial, appellant's counsel claimed that he
had made extensive efforts to locate Mr. Eady, but was unable
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to do so. Weber County prosecutor Mr. Wallace testified
at trial that the fact that Mr. Eady was on probation
would make it relatively simple to find him (Tr.89) „
That Mr. Eady was on probation was a fact which the defense
counsel easily could have ascertained*
Respondent contends that appellant in this case
is requesting that the court subpoena a witness whomi
defendant himself could have subpoened.
With reference to this matter, the Washington
Supreme Court in the case of State v. Smith, 540 P.2d 424
(1975), stated:
"Under court rules, appellant
could himself have subpoenaed the
broadcaster. CrR 4.8, CR 45(a)(1).
This he chose not to do. Under
these circumstances a request to the
trial court to issue a subpoena is
addressed to the discretion of the trial
court, and an adverse decision thereupon
will be overturned only on a showing of
prejudice." 3^d. at 433-434.
In the present case the trial court exercised its
discretion in refusing appellant compulsory process.
Respondent argues that the trial court's position should
only be disturbed by a showing of prejudice.

This position

is supported by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the
case of United States v. Lepiscopo, 458 F.2d 977 (10th Cir.
1972).

The Court in upholding the trial court's decision

to refuse appellant compulsory process stated:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"In his appeal pro se the
appellant claims that he was denied
his right to compulsory process. He
requested several witnessesf five of
these were denied by the trial judge.
Two of those denied were expert witnesses
from Atlanta, Georgia, where the appellant
had been imprisoned prior to transfer to
Leavenworth; the remainder were inmates
at other federal prisons. Rule 17(b)
Fed.R.Crim.P. provides that witnesses
will be subpoenaed at government expense
•upon a satisfactory showing that the
defendant is financially unable to pay
the fees of the witness and that the
presence of the witness is necessary to
an adequate defense.1 A motion to have
a witness produced at government expense
is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court and is not an absolute right.
. . . . These witnesses were to tesitfy on
the insanity issue. None of them had seen
or talked to the defendant for over a year
prior to the offense. The court justifiably
ruled that their testimony was not necessary
to an adequate defense. There was no abuse
of discretion by the trial judge." IcL at
978.
In the present case, appellant failed at the time
of trial to show the materiality of Mr. Eady as a witness.
Appellant also fails now on appeal to show prejudice resulting
from Mr. Eady's failing to testify.
Mr. Eady was not in appellant's or Officer Call's
presence on November 5, 1974, when appellant voluntarily
distributed a controlled substance to Officer Call.

-17Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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What

testimony Mr. Eady had to give pertained to the October
29th offense, Mr. Eady's testimony was immaterial as to the
November 5th offense, his having had nothing to do with
the dealings between appellant and Officer Call on that day.
This was the sound decision of the trial court.
Even if this Court should find that Mr. Eadyfs
testimony was material, respondent contends that the
court's refusal to invoke compulsory process constituted
harmless error in that the substance of Mr. Eady's
testimony given at pretrial hearing on the October 29th
charge was allowed in as hearsay evidence without objection
through the testimony of County Prosecutor Robert Wallace
(Tp.25).
Respondent argues that because Mr. Eady's
testimony that appellant was unwilling to distribute and
was basically entrapped into committing the offense was
allowed in as evidence appellant was neither harmed nor
prejudiced by Mr. Eady's not testifying.
POINT IV
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR AND SPEEDY
TRIAL.
Appellant claims that the prosecution intentionally
delayed his trial for the purpose of preventing appellant
from calling Terrell Eady as a witness. Appellantfs claim
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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is not supported by the record.
Shortly after the commission of the offense for
which appellant has been convicted, the State entered into
a plea negotiation with appellant.

The State agreed not

to prosecute the November 5, 1974, distribution offense
and to reduce the October 29, 1974, offense to a misdemeanor
charge of possession if appellant would agree to plead guilty
to the misdemeanor charge (Tp.20).

Appellant plead guilty,

but later was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.

The court

approved appellantfs guilty plea withdrawal on April 2, 19 75,
approximately six months after the commission of the offense.
(Tp.20).

The record establishes that appellant's tactics

with reference to the plea bargaining agreement caused a
six months' delay in the State's prosecution of this case.
The record further establishes that appellant and his
counsel knew that the State intended to prosecute appellant
on one if not both of the distribution offenses occurring
in October and November.
Following the breakdown in the plea bargaining
agreement, the State began the prosecution anew and chose
to prosecute appellant on the October 29, 1974, distribution
offense.

Trial on that case was set for May 29, 1975. As they

neared that date, County Prosecutor Robert Wallace decided
that the State should prosecute appellant on just one offense
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

rather than on both
the October
29th
and November 5th offenses
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain
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Mr. Wallace also testified that because the
November 5th case was the stronger of the two, the State
decided to drop the October 29th case and prosecute
appellant on the November 5f 1974, offense (Tr.86,87).
Mr. Wallace further testified that the
State's plan v/as made known to appellant's counsel (Tp.23).
A new complaint against appellant alleging the November 5th
offense was then filed prior to the May 29, 1976, trial
d a t e . ' '"••:••

A warrant was not issued for appellant's arrest
at that time,

however, as the State did not feel it was

necessary, and was under the impression from appellant's
counsel that appellant would be out of the Country during
the summer (Tp.21).

Appellant's presence in Weber County

became known when he was picked up on a possession of
marijuana charge in Ogden.

The State then had appellant

arraigned, on the November 5, 1974, distribution offense.
Appellant's case then proceeded through its normal course
to trial.

The record establishes that the Weber County

Prosecutor's Office dealt with appellant in an open and
honest manner.

This was also the finding of the trial judge.

At the conclusion of appellant's trial, Judge
Wahlquist made the following findings of fact:
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"THE COURT: The court finds
the facts to be as follows: First
of all the court believes that
the dismissal of the one and the
filing of a new one is done in good
faith and for reasons of strategy.
What Mr. Wallace has said about his
intent and reasons are true statements
and he has not falsefied to the court
in this regard. What he has said is
true." (Tr.102).
The Statefs trial tactics were exercised in good
faith and for reasons of strategy.

Appellant's claim

that the prosecution's tactics denied him a fair and
speedy trial is unfounded.
POINT V
APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY.
Under Utah lawf a defendant may waive his right
to trial by jury.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2 (1953), as

amended, provides that " . . . waiver shall be made in open
court and entered in the minutes."
The minutes of the court in this case state on
page 36 of the record:
trial by jury."

"Defendant waived his right to

This minute entry was recorded on January

27, 1976, the day of appellant's trial.

(R.36).

Appellant contends now on appeal that he did not
waive his right to trial by jury and that the record is
insufficient to support the fact that he did waive a jury
trial.
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Respondent argues that the Court's minute entry
is sufficient to support the fact that appellant

did waive

his right to trial by jury.
In

Bush v. Bush, 150 P.2d 168 (1944), the Supreme

Court of Kansas said the following concerning the validity
of the court's minutes:
"The minutes of the trial court
may be presumed to be a trustworthy
chronicle of events as they transpired
at trial, and that they are competent
and ordinarily controlling on the
question of what order was in fact
m a d e / Id. at 170.
The validity of the court1s minutes was also
enunciated in an Oklahoma case under facts similar to those
in the present case.

In Smith v. State, 429 P.2d 533 (Court

of Criminal Appeals, Oklahoma 19 67), petitioner Smith in
petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus contended that
he had been denied the representation of counsel at every
stage of his proceedings.

The minute entry of the court

showed that appellant had waived his right to an attorney and
knowingly and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty.

The

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found the minute entry
to be sufficient to establish the fact that appellant had
waived his right to counsel.

In so finding, the Court held:
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"It has been repeatedly held
where a dispute arises as to the
trial procedure, the minutes of the
court are the best evidence of what
transpired," IcL at 534.
In the case before this Court, the best evidence
of what transpired at appellant's trial is the minutes
of the court, and the minutes state that appellant waived
his right to trial by jury.
Arguing in the alternative, respondent contends
that even without the court record stating that appellant
waived his right to a jury trial, appellant should be estopped
from raising the issue now on appeal*
In reviewing the application of Jay Banshbach, for a
writ of habeas corpus or writ of review, 323 P.2d 1112 (Mont*
1958), the Montana Supreme Court stated:
"Of course, if accused proceeds
to trial without making his desires
for a jury known, then he waives a
jury trial under the rule stated in
Ex parte Lewis, 85 Okl.Cr. 322,
188 P.2d 367, and Ex parte Guisti,
51 Nev. 105, 269 P. 600. In other
words, he is not permitted to gamble on
the outcome before the judge without a
jury and then if dissatisfied make a
belated demand for a jury." Id. at 1114-1115.
Appellantfs counsel in this case allowed the non-jury
trial to proceed without objection or claim that appellant
desired a trial by jury.

Counsel for appellant after gambling

that they would win their case in a non-jury trial, now attempts
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to raise the issue of a non-jury trial on appeal.
To allow appellant to induce error on the part
of the trial court for the purpose of having that issue
to raise on appeal, is to allow appellant to abuse the
trial court for his benefit.

Appellant should be

estopped from abusing the trial court in this manner.
CONCLUSION
The Weber County Attorney's Office dealt with
appellant in an open and honest manner as determined by
the trial court.

The record establishes that appellant

was given a fair trial and afforded the constitutional
protections guaranteed him.

For the reasons stated in

this brief, respondent urges this Court to sustain
„ i

appellant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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